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Abstract—Feature engineering is one of the most costly aspects
of developing effective machine learning models, and that cost
is even greater in specialized problem domains, like malware
classification, where expert skills are necessary to identify useful
features. Recent work, however, has shown that deep learning
models can be used to automatically learn feature representations
directly from the raw, unstructured bytes of the binaries them-
selves. In this paper, we explore what these models are learning
about malware. To do so, we examine the learned features at
multiple levels of resolution, from individual byte embeddings
to end-to-end analysis of the model. At each step, we connect
these byte-oriented activations to their original semantics through
parsing and disassembly of the binary to arrive at human-
understandable features. Through our results, we identify several
interesting features learned by the model and their connection to
manually-derived features typically used by traditional machine
learning models. Additionally, we explore the impact of training
data volume and regularization on the quality of the learned
features and the efficacy of the classifiers, revealing the somewhat
paradoxical insight that better generalization does not necessarily
result in better performance for byte-based malware classifiers.
I. INTRODUCTION
To effectively protect users from the latest malware threats,
detection mechanisms must be capable of adapting as quickly
as the threats themselves. Traditional machine learning-based
antivirus (i.e., next-gen AV) solutions provide this capability
by generalizing from previous examples of malware, but often
require laborious development of hand-engineered features by
domain experts to gain a true advantage. Moreover, these
features are often specific to each type of executable file (e.g.,
Portable Executable, Mach-O, ELF, etc.), further compounding
the amount of overhead required. Recently, however, a series
of deep neural network models [1]–[3] have been proposed
that operate directly on the raw bytes of executable files to de-
tect malware - effectively learning the feature representations
directly from the data with no information about its syntax
or semantics. Surprisingly, these byte-based classifiers have
reported accuracy exceeding 0.96 and area under the ROC
curve (AUC) of greater than 0.98.
Given the success of these approaches, an obvious ques-
tion arises: what exactly are these neural networks learning?
Answering this question is important in developing a rigor-
ous understanding of the generalization capabilities of these
models, as well as their robustness to evasion. Furthermore,
this analysis will help to shed light on the connection between
manual feature engineering and feature representation learning
in the malware classification domain. In this paper, we seek to
answer this question by providing a deep and broad analysis
of activations in a byte-based deep neural network classifier
that is representative of the architectures proposed in previous
work. Unlike previous work, however, we expand our analysis
beyond simply looking at the location of the activations to
understanding the specific features that are learned and their
connection to the semantics of the executable as a malware
analyst would understand them. We perform this analysis un-
der a variety of training regimes to gain a better understanding
of the bias-variance tradeoff that exists for byte-based models
in the unique problem area of malware classification.
Specifically, we examine the question at three levels: (1)
the embedding layer to uncover learned similarities among
independent byte values, (2) the first convolutional layer to
identify low-level features over short byte sequences, and
(3) end-to-end analysis for complex features combined over
several layers of aggregation in the model. At each of these
layers, we compare three models trained under increasing
data volumes and levels of regularization to understand the
relationship between these training variables, the features
learned by the models, and the efficacy of those models
in correctly classifying malware. Where possible, we bridge
the gap between raw-byte activations and the semantics of
the executable through automated parsing and disassembly
of the activation locations in an effort to obtain human-
understandable explanations for the model’s predictions.
Overall, the results of our experiments surface a number of
interesting findings about the use of byte-based deep neural
networks for malware classification. For one, our results high-
light the importance of depth in learning rich, semantically-
meaningful features. Simple code-related features only appear
as important features at the lowest levels of the models, while
end-to-end features tended to mirror those features typically
derived from manual feature engineering efforts (e.g., invalid
checksum, presence of certificates in signed binaries, etc.).
Meanwhile, import-related features (i.e., Windows APIs) are
present throughout all levels of our analysis, from the embed-
ding layer to end-to-end features. Perhaps the most important
of these findings is a paradoxical one in which increased
training data volume and regularization results in more generic
features applicable to both classes, but decreased classification
efficacy – perhaps indicating a degree of bias toward malware-
oriented features is beneficial in malware classification.
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Fig. 1: High-level CNN architecture.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
begin in Section II by providing background about the repre-
sentative architecture we examine, the data used to train and
evaluate the models, and the tools used in our experiments.
Next, in Sections III through V, we compare our findings
for the embedding, low-level features, and end-to-end features
from three models trained with increasing levels of data
volume and regularization. Finally, in Section VI, we provide
discussion of the results and their implications for future
development on byte-based deep neural network models for
malware classification.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we begin by first discussing the primary
components of our analysis and the overall methodology we
will use to extract human-understandable features from the
model.
A. Model Architecture
Previous work on byte-based malware classifiers has been
heavily influenced by convolutional neural network architec-
tures (CNNs) for character-level text classification proposed
by Zhang et al. [4]. In general, previous models use a CNN
architecture over a fixed-length byte sequence with an embed-
ding layer and varying numbers of convolutional and pooling
layers. The MalConv architecture proposed by Raff et al. [2],
for instance, uses a single, gated convolutional layer and global
pooling to accommodate large input sequences, while Krcˇa´l
et al. [3] uses four convolutional layers and Johns [1] uses
five. All architectures except for Krcˇa´l et al. use a learnable
embedding layer. In addition, all architectures treat the input
byte sequence equally without taking into account contextual
information about structure, syntax, or semantics.
The architecture that we use in this paper, as shown in
Figure 1, is essentially the same as the one proposed by
Johns [1]. It contains a learnable, 10-dimensional embedding
layer and five alternating convolutional and pooling layers
that hierarchically combine feature outputs from previous
layers. A single fully-connected layer and sigmoid function
are used to perform classification. The input length of our
classifier is restricted to a 100KB sequence, where longer
sequences are truncated and shorter sequences are padded
with a distinguished padding symbol (i.e., the input alphabet
contains 257 symbols). We note that examining the relation-
ship between feature representation and model architecture
remains an interesting avenue of future work, though due to
space constraints could not be experimentally pursued here.
Interested readers can find a comparison of our findings with
those of Demetrio et al. on the MalConv architecture [5] in
Section VI.
B. Data
In our experiments, we use separate datasets for training,
efficacy testing, and activation analysis. Our baseline dataset
consists of 15.62M distinct Windows Portable Executable
(PE) files [6] collected between July 2015 and July 2017
from a combination of VirusTotal [7], ReversingLabs [8],
and other proprietary sources. The dataset was downsampled
using a stratified sampling strategy from a collection of more
than 100M binaries to ensure uniform representation across
malware families, and the final dataset contained 20% malware
and 80% goodware. Additionally, we created a small dataset
that is more in line with previous academic work consisting of
7.27M PE files from the same sources as the baseline dataset,
but collected over a much shorter time frame of July 2016
to November 2016. No sampling was applied to the small
dataset and its proportion of malware was 50%. For testing
classification performance, we use the complete feed of PE
files provided by VirusTotal and ReversingLabs from June 1,
2018 to August 31, 2018, which contains a total of 16.55M
unique PEs with a 50/50 split of malware and goodware.
We use two small-scale datasets to perform our feature
analysis. The first is a random sample of 4,000 PE files taken
from our baseline dataset with an equal split between malware
and goodware, which we use to understand broad activation
trends. The second is a set of six artifacts from the NotPetya,
WannaCry, and BadRabbit ransomware families, including
loaders, payloads, and encryptors. We use this ransomware
dataset to extract specific, concrete features for examination.
Our datasets are designed to follow best practices for
malware classification research presented by Pendlebury et
al. [9], including time-based train/test splits, realistic class
imbalances, and stratified sampling of malware family to
reduce biases. Our validation and testing sets contain samples
that are strictly newer than the training set used to train our
models. For our baseline dataset, we implement an 80/20
goodware to malware ratio to capture the realistic assumption
that the majority of files encountered by malware classifiers on
user machines are, in fact, benign [10]. Our baseline dataset
also used stratified sampling to ensure that no single malware
family is over-represented in our data. As a final note, no
special effort was made to filter our data sources, and as a
result the dataset contains packed and otherwise obfuscated
PE files, in addition to standard binaries.
Fig. 2: Visualization of embedding layers for byte-based malware classifiers using MDS. Colored dots represent outliers
discovered using HDBSCAN. Outliers not shown for Baseline+Dropout due to space restrictions.
TABLE I: Training details and results for three byte-based
malware classification models on our test dataset.
Train Data Test Results
Model Size Mal:Good F1 AUC
Small 7.27M 50:50 0.943 0.98
Baseline 15.62M 20:80 0.919 0.96
Baseline+Dropout 15.62M 20:80 0.869 0.87
C. Methodology
We train three CNN models using the above architecture
and data: (1) a baseline model using the baseline training
dataset, (2) a small model using the small dataset, and (3)
a baseline+dropout model using the baseline data with the ad-
dition of dropout layers added according to recommendations
by Srivastava et al. [11] (with dropout rates of 0.1, 0.25, 0.25,
0.25, 0.5, and 0.5). All models were initialized with Xavier
initialization, and trained for ten epochs using the Momentum
optimizer with decay. Training and validation losses for all
models converged before the end of the tenth epoch.
The results of our initial evaluation of each model on our test
dataset are shown in Table I. In general, the performance of the
small and baseline models falls in line with the results reported
in previous work, while the model using dropout performs
significantly worse. Notice that, paradoxically, the small model
performs the best despite having significantly older and fewer
data points to train on. This result is at odds with common
wisdom that more data and improved regularization will result
in better generalization and, consequently, better classification
performance. We will explore the reasons for this in the
coming sections by comparing the learned features from each
model.
III. EMBEDDING LAYER
Here, we start our exploration by comparing the embedding
layers of our three models. Since the embedding matrix is
treated as a set of learnable parameters during training, the
locations of each of the bytes (plus padding symbol) can
be manipulated within the 10-dimensional embedding space.
Intuitively, if one or more bytes can be used interchangeably
within the learned features (particularly those of low-level
convolutional filters), then they will be densely clustered
within the embedding space. Conversely, outliers within this
space indicate byte values that are distinguished in some way
and incur significant cost to swap.
To identify these clusters and their outliers, we apply
hierarchical density-based clustering (HDBSCAN) [12] on
the points in the embedding space. As the name suggests,
this algorithm extracts clusters based on their density, but
unlike traditional DBSCAN does not require near-uniform
density among clusters since the appropriate distance (i.e.,
) is inferred for each neighborhood from the data, in a
hierarchical manner. The two parameters that we control are
(1) the minimum number of points necessary to define a
cluster, which we set to two, and (2) the minimum number
of samples to define a neighborhood used to calculate cluster
density, which we set to one. Both parameters settings allow
for a fairly liberal and relaxed density calculation and should
maximize the number of clusters (resp., minimize outliers). We
visualize the embedding space, as shown in Figure 2, using
metric multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) [13], which we found
provides a good approximation for the underlying clustering
behavior.
A few broad trends are immediately evident when com-
paring the embedding space visualizations and discovered
outliers – the number of outliers and overall sparsity of the
space increases as we move from our small model to the
regularized baseline+dropout model. The small model has 13
outliers, which increases to 31 for baseline, and up to 158 for
baseline+dropout. Both the small and baseline model had a
small number of clusters, with one of those clusters containing
the vast majority of bytes, indicating that many of the bytes are
Fig. 3: Distribution of top-100 activations across 96 first-level filters.
Fig. 4: Distribution of top-100 activation locations across file offsets.
interchangeable within higher-level features. At the same time,
the increase in sparsity among the models and large numbers
of outliers for the baseline+dropout model could be indicative
of the models moving toward more restrictive byte sequence
features in the low-level convolutional filters.
Additionally, the outliers shared by the small and baseline
models are quite informative of what features might be learned
at the upper layers of the model. These outliers include typical
x86 register values (eax/0x0, ecx/0x1, edx/0x2, ebx/0x3),
several ASCII characters (‘e’/0x65, ‘o’/0x6f, ‘t’/0x74), and
the ’call’ instruction (0xe8). Notably, the baseline model also
includes several more ASCII characters (‘W’/0x57, ‘s’/0x73,
‘\n’/0xa) and instructions (loop/0xe0, loopne/0xe2), which
again points to increasing specificity in the learned features.
More generally, however, we see a clear predilection across
all models toward features associated with ASCII strings and
control flow instructions. As we will see in the next section,
these outlier bytes will play a key role in defining the low-level
features, such as import names and instruction sequences.
IV. LOW-LEVEL FEATURES
With the results of our embedding analysis in mind, we
now move up one level to the first convolutional layer. In
our architecture, this layer has 96 filters with a kernel width
of eleven bytes and a stride of one, resulting in 102,390
convolutions over our embedded 100KB input sequence. We
examine these convolutions in two ways. First, we look for
broad trends in the locations and filter usage for the three
models, along with how those trends differ between malware
and goodware classes. Second, we look at the specific features
identified by the models in our ransomware dataset by parsing
the binaries using PEFile [14] and disassembling them with
BinaryNinja [15].
To begin, let us draw some insight into the differences
in filter usage and activation locations across our models by
extracting the top-100 activations from each of our 4,000 PE
file samples. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these acti-
vations across our 96 first-level filters. One interesting trend
that arises is that utilization of filters increases dramatically
as we go from our small model to the baseline+dropout
model. At the same time, the vast majority of activations
remain on a single filter while the remainder become more
diffusely spread among the other filters. While the filters
used in the malware and goodware classes remains mostly
the same, the number of malware activations is significantly
higher than goodware for the small and baseline models, but
equalizes for the baseline+dropout model. More concretely,
the filters in the small and baseline models have five times
more malware activations than the baseline+dropout model,
which itself shows only a nominal (55% vs. 45%) bias toward
malware activations. This is an interesting observation because
it hints at the idea that these low-level features are, in some
way, more biased toward malware even though the underlying
dataset may have an imbalance toward goodware – the small
model has 50% goodware, while baseline has 80% goodware.
By adding regularization in the form of dropout, the model
appears to be learning more generically-applicable features
across the two classes, but at the cost of worse overall
classification performance.
We also examine the location of the top activations by file
offset, as illustrated in Figure 4. Again, we observe some dis-
tinctive trends as we increase dataset size and regularization,
but only in our malware class. In particular, the location of
activations moves from the start of the files (i.e., PE headers)
in the small model and gets distributed throughout the file as
we move toward the baseline+dropout model. Most notably,
the baseline+dropout model no longer focuses the majority of
activations on the PE headers, but instead spreads those acti-
vations around the same high-activation areas found in other
models. That is, the areas of interest identified by the models
remains relatively stable, but their overall impact on the low-
level activations is markedly different. For goodware, on the
other hand, the overall distribution looks quite similar across
all models, albeit with less concentration toward the start of
the files in the baseline+dropout model. Taken together with
the filter analysis above, we see the impact of regularization
as a trend of moving away from heavily-weighted, malware-
oriented features and toward more generic features with more
uniform activation values.
TABLE II: Example features from disassembled ransomware.
Features
Model Strings Instructions
Small Filter 71: ‘C’, ‘r’, ‘@’ Filter 16: Push sequences(0x40f0c8L): tGenKey.
(0x40f0d0L): CryptDec
(0x40f0d8L): rypt....
(0x40f0e0L): CryptEnc
(0x40f0e8L): rypt....
(0x10007edbL): je,0x10007ff1
(0x10007ee1L): push,0xff
(0x10007ee6L): push,edi
(0x10007ee7L): push,0x10007ca5
(0x10007eecL): push,0x4
Baseline Filter 83: ‘r’, ‘s’ Filter 57: Function calls(0x40d850L): ....GetP
(0x40d858L): rocAddre
(0x40d860L): ss..R.Lo
(0x40d868L): adLibrar
(0x40d870L): yA....Gl
(0x4046b4L): push,0x0
(0x4046b6L): push,0x0
(0x4046b8L): push,0x1
(0x4046baL): push,0x0
(0x4046bcL): call,dword,15042
Baseline+Dropout Filter 11: ‘Directory’ Filter 61: mov sequences(0x40d9e0L): ctoryW..
(0x40d9e8L): N.Create
(0x40d9f0L): ,Director
(0x40d9f8L): yW....Ge
(0x40da00L): tTempPat
(0x408d65L): je, 0x408d6a
(0x408d67L): mov, dword , edx
(0x408d6aL): mov, esi, dword
(0x408d6dL): mov, dword, esi
(0x408d70L): mov, ecx, dword
To further substantiate our intuitions about low-level fea-
tures, we now compare the disassembly of the activation
locations for several of the most prevalent filters applied to our
ransomware dataset. Doing so provides both a notion of the
types of features identified, as well as how those features vary
across our models. Generally, the filters appear to have two
primary types of features: common instruction sequences and
ASCII strings (e.g., import names). Some example features
for each type are shown in Table II. While all filter activations
have a certain level of variability due to incidental detection of
the relatively short eleven-byte sequences, there is a clear trend
toward more precise, limited features in our baseline and base-
line+dropout models versus the small model. That is, filters for
the baseline+dropout model are precisely constrained to very
specific strings and instruction sequences, whereas the small
model has relatively loose filters resulting in more spurious
activations. For example, Table II shows import activations
for the small and baseline models where the commonality
is based on the number of specific ASCII characters in the
convolution, thereby allowing activations for a large class of
similar imports, while the baseline+dropout model has entire
filters looking for only a single string, such as “Directory.”
Similarly, the most prevalent filter in the baseline+dropout
model, filter 55, activates solely on areas of padding between
sections containing multiple padding bytes (0xff). We observe
similar behaviors among the instruction sequences, where
increasingly specific context restrictions are imposed, from an
activation containing any push instruction in the small model
to a specific sequence of mov instructions in the case of the
baseline+dropout model.
Overall, these results highlight some very important prop-
erties of our models. For one, we see the relationship between
the outlier bytes identified in our embedding analysis and their
role as keys or anchors used to define many of the most
important filter features in the first convolutional layer. There
is also certainly a heavy reliance on import name features,
with that reliance increasing in the baseline+dropout model.
Additionally, the instruction sequences coincidentally capture
some useful behavioral features, such as the use of push-call
sequences to fingerprint certain types of function calls (e.g.,
Windows APIs with multiple parameters). Together, the import
name and instruction sequence features represent two sides
of the same underlying import usage behavior that is often
included in manually-derived features, though the connection
between the import and where (or if) it is actually used is
clearly lost due to the inability of the CNN architecture to
understand the offsets and indirection used. Finally, we begin
to see clues that the poor performance of the baseline+dropout
model may be due to the reduction in importance for malware-
oriented features, which again challenges our natural intuition
that increased generalization should result in improved classi-
fication performance.
V. END-TO-END FEATURES
For our final set of experiments, we take a holistic view
on the learned features by connecting segments of the input
sequence with their contribution to the final score produced by
the model. We use the SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP)
framework proposed by Lundberg and Lee [16] to assign
contributions to each input feature – in our case individual
bytes – using concepts derived from cooperative game theory
(i.e., Shapley value). Specifically, we use the GradientSHAP
[17] method, which combines the Integrated Gradients [18]
and SmoothGrad [19] techniques with the SHAP framework.
Intuitively, the method calculates the expectation of the gradi-
ents between the given input and a large number of randomly
sampled feature vectors generated from a background dataset.
The end result is a precise attribution of the input features that
contributed to a given classification. Our experiments used the
4,000 sample analysis dataset as the background set, 1,000
random samples, and no local smoothing when computing
SHAP values. We also note that GradientSHAP requires a
fully differentiable model, which is incompatible with our
embedding layer. Instead we perform the explanation after
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Fig. 5: Distribution of SHAP values for the WannaCry worm. SHAP values greater than zero indicate maliciously-oriented
features. The largest malicious and benign SHAP values are annotated with their underlying semantics in the disassembly.
embedding and recover each byte’s SHAP value by taking
their sum over the embedding dimensions.
We apply GradientSHAP to each ransomware artifact in
our analysis dataset and, like our low-level filter analysis,
reference the disassembly of the files to connect the byte-
oriented contributions to human-understandable features. To
make the analysis of features easier, we combined contiguous
bytes with the same contribution directionality (i.e., toward
malware or goodware) into segments and define the segment
SHAP value as the sum of the constituent byte SHAP values.
Figure 5 shows these segment SHAP values for the Wan-
naCry worm (SHA1: db349b97c37d22f5ea1d1841e3c89eb4).
Positive SHAP values indicate that the bytes in the segment are
pushing the model toward a classification of malware, while
negative values indicate a contribution toward a goodware
verdict.
Starting again with broad observations across the three
models, we see that the increasing specificity of features in
the baseline and baseline+dropout models is evident even in
our end-to-end analysis. With the baseline+dropout model in
particular, the evidence for malware classification is concen-
trated on a small number of segments related to only a few
underlying structures in the PE file. By contrast, the small
model has evidence spread throughout the byte sequence,
including segments that overlap with the other two models. At
the same time, the small model also includes a large number of
spurious benign features that significantly reduce the malware
probability for the file.
Diving deeper, we see a number of important (i.e., high
SHAP value) features annotated in the Figure 5 that clearly
align with features typically found via manual feature en-
gineering. One such feature is the detection of a checksum
set to zero in the small and baseline models. While not an
inherently malicious property of the file, a large fraction of
malware contain incorrect checksums, which makes it a useful
distinguishing feature. Interestingly, in the baseline+dropout
model, the checksum-related feature actually flips and be-
comes a goodware-oriented feature that checks for a non-zero
value – reinforcing our findings that regularization forces the
model away from malware-centric features. Other features of
note include detecting the absence of the standard security
directory that exists with signed code, identifying import and
export tables within an embedded PE file, and several import
names. We hypothesize that these complex, high-level features
are learned based on the fact that structures found later in
the PE file are shifted, which creates unusual locality among
lower-level features that the model is able to take advantage
of due to its hierarchical pooling architecture.
The results of our analysis on the ransomware artifacts also
contained one high-level feature whose role in pushing the
model towards benign classifications was not obvious to us at
first glance. Specifically, we identified several instances where
the most important benign end-to-end features referenced the
so-called Rich header [20], as annotated in Figure 5. The Rich
header is added only by Microsoft’s linker and contains an
XOR encrypted set of linker metadata about the binary, such
as the number of objects and linker version used. However,
since this information is effectively randomized we should
not expect the model to learn useful information from this
area of the binary. What we believe is happening is that the
model is, like other high-level structures, learning whether
the Rich header is present based on the location of a string
that directly follows the Rich header. If the Rich header is
detected, then the model knows that a Microsoft linker is used
and, as it turns out, a non-trivial fraction of malware is built
using non-Microsoft toolchains (e.g., Delphi) [21], [22]. The
linker and its version are actually common manually-derived
features, and the model appears to have effectively inferred
that same feature via the complex interplay of several low-level
features, demonstrating the potential of byte-based models to
extract unusual but highly-effective features without human
intervention.
VI. CONCLUSION
Byte-based deep learning classifiers have proven to be a
viable alternative to traditional machine learning for malware
classification, without the cost of manual feature engineering.
Through our experiments, we have explored what the deep
neural networks are learning about Windows PE files in order
to separate malware from goodware.
Our findings show that import-related features play a very
important role in the operation of the models – appearing at all
levels of our analysis, from embedding to end-to-end features.
We also discovered that the embedding layer and low-level
convolutional filters learned features related to ASCII strings
and instruction sequences, with some filters capturing useful
behavioral indicators like the use of system calls through push-
call sequences. However, these instruction-oriented features
do not appear in our end-to-end analysis. Instead, the depth
and complexity of the model’s architecture allowed it to
learn intuitive and meaningful features, including incorrect
checksums and the presence of certificates. The models were
also able to learn some novel features, such as the presence of
the Rich header as a proxy for linker type information. Many
of these features are used in machine learning classifiers with
manually-derived features (e.g., Saxe and Berlin [23]).
Perhaps the most interesting result was the paradoxical
impact that increased data volume and regularization had on
classification performance. Although the highly-regularized
dropout model learned more general features across both mal-
ware and goodware classes, its performance was substantially
worse than a model with an older and smaller training set.
One explanation for this behavior is that, malware-oriented
features (or the lack thereof) are strong indicators of class
membership for both malware and goodware – similar to the
way traditional antivirus signatures operate. Another potential
explanation is that the baseline+dropout model was not trained
for long enough to fully converge, which Srivastava et al. warn
could take 2-3 times longer than the original architecture [11].
However, we note that validation loss had plateaued before the
final training epoch, which makes that explanation somewhat
less likely.
To underscore the importance of these findings in identify-
ing promising avenues of future work, we can compare our
results to those of Demetrio et al., who performed a similar
analysis on the MalConv byte-based malware classifier [5].
In their analysis, Demetrio et al. found that nearly all of the
most influential activations for the MalConv model occurred
in the headers of the PE file due to its use of a single, gated
convolutional layer and global pooling. Overall, the MalConv
features were found to be mostly devoid of semantic meaning.
These results stand in stark contrast to our own, which show
that with sufficient model depth and training data volume, deep
neural networks can learn feature representations that closely
mimic those created by subject-matter experts. Moreover, our
results indicate that influential features are learned throughout
the entire length of the input byte sequence, thereby providing
evidence that the type of hierarchical architecture examined
here may learn more diverse and robust features. Taken as
a whole, our results provide interesting insight into the role
that architecture, regularization, and data characteristics play
in developing byte-based malware classifiers, and hopefully
improve our overall understanding of the malware classifica-
tion problem.
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